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Hislop v. Canada —  
A Retroactive Look 
Daniel Guttman 
I. OVERVIEW 
In the recent case of Hislop v. Canada, the Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
The supremacy clause, now enshrined at s. 52, is silent about the 
remedies which may flow from a declaration of nullity. Does it mean 
that such a declaration is always both prospective and retroactive? This 
does not appear to have been the position of our Court throughout the 
incremental development of the law of constitutional remedies after 
the adoption of the Charter. A body of jurisprudence now accepts the 
legitimacy of limiting the retroactive effect of a declaration of nullity 
and of fashioning prospective remedies in appropriate circumstances. 
..... 
When the Court is declaring the law as it has existed, then the 
Blackstonian approach is appropriate and retroactive relief should be 
granted. On the other hand, when a court is developing new law within 
the broad confines of the Constitution, it may be appropriate to limit 
the retroactive effect of its judgment.1 
The Court went on to unanimously hold, in the circumstances of the 
Hislop appeal, that Canada was not obliged to extend retroactive 
benefits to claimants to remedy the effect of an unconstitutional law.2 In 
                                                                                                             

  Counsel, Attorney General of Ontario. The views expressed in this article are the 
author’s own and should not be attributed to the Attorney General or the government of Ontario. I 
disclose that I was counsel in Hislop v. Canada for the intervenor Attorney General of Ontario at the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada (the intervention was restricted to the payment of 
retroactive arrears issue). I would like to thank my colleagues Robert Charney and Mark Crow for 
their comments on a previous draft. 
1
  Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, at 
paras. 80, 93 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
2
  The Supreme Court found that Mr. Hislop and the rest of the class claimants (Hislop was 
the class representative) were entitled to up to one year of retroactivity because the CPP provided 
this in a general provision (R.S.C. 1985 c. C.-8 s. 72(1)).  
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so doing, the Court confirmed that it would be in only the rarest of cases 
that a government would be obliged, when it remedied under-inclusive 
legislation by extending a benefit, to extend that benefit retroactively to 
April 17, 1985 — the date section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms3 came into force.  
Part II of this paper briefly sets out the facts of Hislop and 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision. Part III examines the 
theoretical underpinnings of the retroactive nature of declarations of 
invalidity in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence before Hislop. Part IV 
offers some commentary on the new test created by the Supreme Court 
to determine whether a declaration of invalidity is to be fully retroactive 
in nature. Part V offers a possible alternative basis to support the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hislop not to award retroactive arrears. 
II. HISLOP V. CANADA 
At issue in Hislop was the validity of several provisions of the 
Canada Pension Plan,4
 
including provisions that Canada had enacted in 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act5 which extended survivor 
pension benefits provided by the CPP to same-sex survivors.6 On a 
purely prospective basis, the provisions treated same-sex contributors 
and their spouses equally with all other people. However, the 
amendments limited same-sex survivor pensions in two critical ways.  
The first was that imposed in section 44(1.1) of the CPP. That 
subsection specified that the survivor pension was extended to only 
those same-sex survivors whose contributing partners died after January 
1, 1998, rather than simply to all same-sex survivors of contributors. 
Under this provision, any surviving partner whose partner died prior to 
1998 could not receive a pension. This retrospective limit on the 
extension of the benefit was found to be unconstitutional at all levels of 
court. 
The second limit was on the arrears that eligible survivors could 
receive pursuant to section 72(2). Under that section, survivors were 
eligible for benefits only with respect to the period after July 1, 2000 
                                                                                                             
3
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 [hereinafter “CPP”]. 
5
  S.C. 2000, c. 12 [hereinafter “MOBA”]. 
6
  The relevant provisions of the CPP are excerpted in the Appendix at the end of this 
article. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) HISLOP V. CANADA 549 
(i.e., the month section 72(2) came into force) and were not therefore 
eligible for any arrears that would have accrued before July 1, 2000. 
This section was a more severe limit on the class claimants than the 
general limit on retroactive arrears in the CPP (section 72(1)) which 
limited the payment of arrears to one year prior to the date of 
application.7 The Court had to determine whether the stricter restrictions 
on recovery of arrears in section 72(2) violated the equality rights of the 
class claimants. The Court was also asked to determine whether the class 
claimants could receive a constitutional exemption from the application 
of the general limitation on retroactivity in section 72(1). 
The trial judge found that section 72(2) was unconstitutional and that 
the claimants were entitled to benefit arrears extending back to April 1, 
1985. Faced with the one-year general limitation on arrears in section 
72(1), MacDonald J. granted class members a constitutional exemption 
from that section (as well as from section 60(2)), without finding that it 
was unconstitutional, and despite the fact that a challenge to that 
subsection had not been included in the Notice of Constitutional 
Question filed at trial.8 This remedy entitled survivors to arrears 
beginning one month after the date of their partner’s death. 
The retroactive nature of the constitutional remedy given by the trial 
judge was scaled back by the Court of Appeal in a nuanced judgment.9 
The court found that section 72(2) was overly restrictive but only in 
comparison to section 72(1). The effect of the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment was that claimants would get the survivor benefit on a 
retrospective basis but could only receive arrears to a year before they 
had applied for the survivor benefit, if they would otherwise qualify for 
it. Thus, if a survivor’s partner died January 1, 1986 but the survivor had 
only applied for a pension on January 1, 2000, the survivor would only 
get arrears for one year rather than 14 years.  
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, stating that a prospective remedy was appropriate in the 
circumstances of this appeal and that “a retroactive remedy would be 
unwarranted in respect of s. 72(1) CPP”.10 In reaching this conclusion, 
                                                                                                             
7
  Section 60(2) requires that an application for a survivor’s pension made by the estate of a 
deceased survivor be made within 12 months of the survivor’s death. 
8
  Decision of the trial judge, [2003] O.J. No. 5212, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465, at paras. 116-19 
(Ont. S.C.J.). 
9
  [2004] O.J. No. 4815, 246 D.L.R. (4th) 644 (Ont. C.A.). 
10
  Hislop, supra, note 1, at para. 78. 
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they reconciled the competing strands of jurisprudence regarding the 
retroactive nature of a declaration of invalidity.  
The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision was that all same-sex 
survivors alive in January 2000, regardless of the date of death of their 
contributing partner, would receive an equal pension on a prospective 
basis to their heterosexual counterparts. However, these survivors would 
not receive arrears back to the date of their partner’s death — rather they 
would receive arrears to one year prior to their date of application. While 
some may view this as a results-oriented decision that both Canada and 
the class claimants could live with, in my view, as I explain below, the 
decision was a principled one despite the split result for each party. 
III. A THEORETICAL LOOK AT THE RETROACTIVE NATURE OF 
DECLARATIONS OF INVALIDITY 
1. The Blackstonian View 
Under the traditional view — termed the “declaratory approach” in 
the Hislop judgment11
 
— section 52(1) remedies are deemed to be fully 
retroactive because the legislature never had the authority to enact an 
unconstitutional law. The traditional view starts from the basis that a 
declaration of constitutional invalidity “involves the nullification of the 
law from the outset”.12 On this theory, if the law is invalid from the 
outset, then any government action taken pursuant to that law is also 
invalid, and consequently, those affected by it have a right to redress 
which reaches back into the past. The declaratory approach is derived 
from Blackstone’s famous aphorism that “judges do not create law but 
merely discover it”.13 This aphorism reflects the view that courts grant 
retroactive relief applying existing law or rediscovered rules which are 
deemed to have always existed. The traditional view accepts that the 
courts are adjudicative bodies that are called upon to decide the legal 
consequences of past happenings, and thus they generally grant remedies 
that are to the extent necessary to ensure that successful litigants will 
have the benefit of the ruling.  
                                                                                                             
11
  Id., at para. 83ff. 
12
  Id., at para. 83, quoting Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 2, loose-leaf ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at 55-2 [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
13
  Id., at para. 84. 
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2.  Limited Application of the Blackstonian Approach in the 
Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada 
While the Supreme Court has almost always espoused the traditional 
view in its judgments, this approach has not been free from criticism. 
The alternative view recognizes that “[j]udges do not merely declare 
law; they also make law  especially in the common law world” and 
that “judges fulfill a legitimate law-making function”.14 Under this view, 
Blackstone’s view is a fiction and that fiction should not be turned into 
an ironclad principle. 
Without abandoning the traditional approach, the Supreme Court has 
found that a fully retroactive declaration is not always a practical 
solution and for this reason, among others, has strayed from the 
traditional approach and limited the retroactive nature of declarations of 
invalidity in many cases. The Supreme Court has limited the fully 
retroactive nature of declarations of invalidity in at least five major ways: 
(a) temporary suspensions; (b) prospective overrulings accompanied by 
transition periods; (c) the doctrine of qualified immunity; (d) the general 
rule limiting individual remedies in combination with a declaration of 
invalidity; and (e) res judicata and the de facto doctrine. I will examine 
each in turn.  
(a)  Temporary Suspensions  
The practice of the Supreme Court in recent years has largely been 
to suspend a declaration of invalidity, most usually for one year, in order 
to allow the government time to enact legislation to respond to the 
court’s finding of unconstitutionality. Thus, the purpose of a suspended 
declaration of invalidity is to facilitate the legislature’s function in 
crafting a remedy. If the government fails to enact new legislation within 
the period of suspension, the Court’s declaration would apply retroactively, 
unless they receive an extension from the Court. The Court has stated 
that it is appropriate to suspend its declaration of invalidity in three 
instances: when giving immediate retroactive effect to the Court’s 
declaration of invalidity would (a) “pose a danger to the public”; (b) 
“threaten the rule of law”; or (c) “result in the deprivation of benefits 
from deserving persons”, such as when the legislation was “deemed 
                                                                                                             
14
  Id., at para. 85, citing Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972-1973), 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22. 
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unconstitutional because of underinclusiveness rather than overbreadth”.15 
However, suspensions have now become routine at the Supreme Court 
of Canada with little analysis.16  
The suspended declaration of invalidity is inconsistent with 
retroactive remedies and the Blackstonian approach. By suspending the 
declaration of invalidity, the Court allows the constitutional infirmity to 
continue temporarily so that the legislature can fix the problem. In other 
words, the Court extends the life of a law which, on the Blackstonian 
view, never existed. The temporal delay in striking down the law also 
has the effect of extending the life of an unconstitutional law. 
As others have noted, the practice over the last decade of the 
Supreme Court of Canada has been to suspend its declaration of 
invalidity where, as in most cases, it is unsure how government would 
have proceeded if it had known what it did was unconstitutional.17 The 
general practice of governments to rectify the constitutional infirmity has 
been to enact corrective legislation that is entirely prospective (the 
limited retroactivity included in the MOBA amendments is a rare 
exception). Before Hislop, the Court had not commented on the 
acceptability of prospective remedial legislation or heard a case in which 
remedial legislation was challenged as being insufficiently retroactive.18 
(b)  Prospective Overrulings and Transition Periods 
While common in the United States, the Supreme Court has rarely 
issued a declaration that was expressly prospective only.19 On my 
review, the only case is Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the 
                                                                                                             
15
  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at para. 85 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Schachter”]. 
16
  Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and 
Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205, at 211 and 218; Bruce Ryder, 
“Suspending the Charter” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 267. See also Hogg, supra, note 12. 
17
  In M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court actually 
decided to suspend its declaration even though Ontario had expressly asked the Court not to do so. 
18
  In my view, the fact that there has been no challenge or comment on the validity of 
prospective remedial legislation by the Supreme Court because it has been assumed that prospective 
legislation was sufficient to cure a constitutional defect in cases where the Court has suspended its 
declaration of invalidity. If this is the case, then the use of suspended declarations, which allow for 
and anticipate a prospective government remedy, reflects a further departure from the traditional 
Blackstonian approach than the one described in the text above. 
19
  Hogg, supra, note 12. However, the Court routinely suspends its declaration of 
invalidity, the consequences of which is that claimants do not usually receive a retroactive remedy. 
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Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island.20 In that reference, the Court 
held that the provinces’ remuneration scheme for provincial judges 
violated the right to a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. 
In fashioning its remedy, the Court provided for a “transition period of 
one year before th[e] requirement [took] effect”.21 The Court’s use of a 
prospective overruling with a transition period is inconsistent with the 
traditional declaratory approach as it continued in force a law that it had 
found to be unconstitutional (and therefore, theoretically, to have never 
had force or effect) and eliminated any retroactive effect of its 
declaration. 
(c)  The Rule against Individual Remedies in Combination with a 
Declaration of Invalidity 
The Court has established a rule that individual claimants cannot 
receive an individual damage award in conjunction with a declaration of 
invalidity because to allow the claimants to recover concurrent 
retroactive relief would be at cross-purposes with the Court’s decision to 
grant a suspended declaration of invalidity.22  
(d)  Qualified Immunity 
The declaratory approach is also not easily reconcilable with the 
well-established doctrine of qualified immunity which states that where 
legislation is found to be invalid as a result of a judicial shift in the law, 
it will not generally be appropriate to impose liability on the 
government.23 As recognized by the Supreme Court, “it is a general rule 
of public law that absent conduct that is clearly wrong, in bad faith or an 
abuse of power, the courts will not award damages for the harm suffered 
as a result of the mere enactment or application of a law that is 
subsequently declared to be unconstitutional”.24 The rationale for this 
qualified immunity, which applies equally to actions for damages based 
                                                                                                             
20
  [1998] S.C.J. No. 10, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
21
  Id., at para. 18. 
22
  Schachter, supra, note 15, at 720. 
23
  Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
405 (S.C.C.); Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 91, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 
(S.C.C.). 
24
  Mackin, id., at para. 78. 
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on the general law of civil liability and to claims for damages under 
section 24(1) of the Charter, was set out in Mackin as follows:  
the government and its representatives are required to exercise their 
powers in good faith and to respect the “established and indisputable” 
laws that define the constitutional rights of individuals. However, if 
they act in good faith and without abusing their power under prevailing 
law and only subsequently are their acts found to be unconstitutional, 
they will not be liable. Otherwise, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government action would be excessively constrained. Laws must be 
given their full force and effect as long as they are not declared invalid. 
Thus it is only in the event of conduct that is clearly wrong, in bad 
faith or an abuse of power that damages may be awarded.25  
(e)  Res Judicata and the De Facto Doctrine 
The de facto doctrine, which validates acts done under laws 
subsequently found to be unconstitutional, has been used by the Supreme 
Court of Canada to temper the retroactive nature of declarations of 
invalidity under the traditional approach. De facto characterizes a state 
of affairs which, for all practical purposes, must be accepted 
notwithstanding its illegality or illegitimacy.26 
The de facto doctrine was discussed in detail by the Supreme Court 
in the seminal case of Re Manitoba Language Rights.27 In that case, the 
Court found that all the Acts of the Legislature of Manitoba were invalid 
because they were unilingual, contrary to the requirement in section 23 
of the Manitoba Act, 1870 which required all Acts to be passed in both 
French and English. However, the Court applied the de facto doctrine to 
avoid “a legal vacuum in Manitoba”.28 The Court explained that the 
doctrine recognizes and gives effect to justify expectations of those who 
have relied upon the acts of those administering invalid laws: 
... thus, the de facto doctrine will save those rights, obligations and 
other effects which have arisen out of actions performed pursuant to 
invalid Acts of the Manitoba Legislature by public and private bodies 
                                                                                                             
25
  Id., at para. 79. 
26
  The de facto doctrine validates the acts of officials administering laws subsequently 
found to be unconstitutional. The de facto doctrine preserves the valuable interests of finality and 
certainty in the law. 
27
  [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.). 
28
  Id., at para. 67. The court in that case also applied res judicata, mistake of law and the 
doctrine of state necessity. 
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corporate, judges, persons exercising statutory powers and public 
officials. Such rights, obligations and other effects are, and always will 
be, enforceable and unassailable.29 
The de facto doctrine has also been applied in the criminal context in 
conjunction with res judicata to respond to the practical problems that 
flow from declarations of constitutional invalidity — specifically to 
uphold convictions on charges that were subsequently found to be 
unconstitutional. In the leading case of R. v. Sarson,30 after the accused 
was convicted of constructive murder and sentenced, he challenged the 
validity of his sentence on the basis that the constructive murder 
provisions of the Criminal Code had been found to be constitutionally 
invalid by the Supreme Court in another case.31 The decision of Watt J. 
[as he then was] upholding the sentence was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court. Justice Watt found that the de facto 
doctrine was a complete defence to the accused’s challenge:  
The applicant entered a plea of guilty which was accepted, recorded 
and acted upon by the trial judge who imposed a sentence authorized 
by law for the offence of which the applicant was convicted. All 
actions were taken or performed upon the basis of a statutory provision 
later determined to be constitutionally invalid. It is under that law that 
the applicant’s obligations arise. They arise out of actions performed 
pursuant to an invalid statute by a court acting upon colour of 
authority. The de facto doctrine precludes any challenge to the 
enforceability of the sentence.32 
The de facto doctrine and res judicata are another example of doctrines 
which the Supreme Court has employed to diminish the retroactive 
nature of declarations of invalidity. These doctrines are inconsistent with 
the Blackstonian approach as they preserve the past effects of a 
provision later found to be constitutionally flawed. 
                                                                                                             
29
  Id., at para. 80. 
30
  [1992] O.J. No. 1089, 73 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.), affd [1994] O.J. No. 769, 88 
C.C.C. (3d) 95 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.). 
31
  Id., at 28-29. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
32
  Id., at para. 65. 
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3.  Reconciling the Practice with the Theory: the Court’s Judgment 
in Hislop 
In Hislop, after reviewing the exceptions to the declaratory 
approach, the Court accepted that there is no sound theoretical basis for 
applying the Blackstonian approach in all instances where the Court has 
made a declaration of invalidity. Thus, the Court found that the extent to 
which a declaration of invalidity would be retroactive depends on the 
circumstances of the case. The fully retroactive Blackstonian approach 
applies when judges are “applying the existing law” but does not apply 
to situations in which judges are fashioning new legal rules or principles. 
The Court explained that “where courts apply pre-existing legal doctrine 
to a new set of facts, Blackstone’s declaratory approach remains 
appropriate and remedies are necessarily retroactive”.33  
However, according to the Supreme Court, “when the law changes 
through judicial intervention, courts operate outside of the Blackstonian 
paradigm”.34 It is in those situations that courts can consider issuing a 
prospective rather than a retroactive remedy. As stated by the Court: 
Fully retroactive remedies might prove highly disruptive in respect of 
government action, which, on the basis of settled or broadly held views 
of the law as it stood, framed budgets or attempted to design social 
programs. Persons and public authorities could then become liable 
under a new legal norm. Neither governments nor citizens could be 
reasonably assured of the legal consequences of their actions at the 
time they are taken. 
..... 
People generally conduct their affairs based on their understanding 
of what the law requires. Governments in this country are no different. 
Every law they pass or administrative action they take must be 
performed with an eye to what the Constitution requires. Just as 
ignorance of the law is no excuse for an individual who breaks the law, 
ignorance of the Constitution is no excuse for governments. But where 
a judicial ruling changes the existing law or creates new law, it may, 
under certain conditions, be inappropriate to hold the government 
retroactively liable. An approach to constitutional interpretation that 
makes it possible to identify, in appropriate cases, a point in time when 
the law changed, makes it easier to ensure that persons and legislatures 
who relied on the former legal rule while it prevailed will be protected. 
                                                                                                             
33
  Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, at para. 86 (S.C.C.). 
34
  Id. 
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In this way, a balance is struck between the legitimate reliance interests 
of actors who make decisions based on a reasonable assessment of the 
state of the law at the relevant time on one hand and the need to allow 
constitutional jurisprudence to evolve over time on the other.35 
Thus the Court has established that whether the retroactive effect of a 
declaration of constitutional invalidity should be limited and a purely 
prospective remedy granted “will be largely determined by whether the 
Court is operating inside or outside the Blackstonian paradigm”.36 The 
test developed in Hislop to determine whether a declaration will have 
retroactive effect is as follows: 
I. Has there been a substantial change in the law? 
II. If so, the following non-exhaustive factors should be weighed to 
determine whether a retroactive remedy is appropriate:  
1) reasonable reliance by government;  
2) good faith reliance by government; 
3) “the fairness of the limitation of the retroactivity of the 
remedy to the litigants”; and  
4) “whether a retroactive remedy would unduly interfere with the 
constitutional role of legislatures and democratic governments 
in the allocation of public resources”.37 
Applying this test, the Court found that Hislop was a case where the 
declaration of invalidity should not be fully retroactive. First, the Court 
noted that its 1999 decision of M. v. H. (which necessitated the change to 
the CPP) represented a “clear shift in the jurisprudence of this Court”.38 
Second, the Court found that the additional four factors supported a 
prospective remedy. According to the Supreme Court “given the state of 
the jurisprudence prior to M. v. H. the exclusion of same-sex partners 
from the former CPP was based on a reasonable understanding of the 
state of s. 15(1) jurisprudence as it existed after Egan and before M. v. 
H.”39 Similarly, the Court found “the government did not act in bad faith 
in failing to extend survivors’ benefits to same-sex couples prior to M. v. 
H”.40 In relation to the four factors, the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
                                                                                                             
35
  Id., at paras. 101-103. 
36
  Id., at para. 93. 
37
  Id., at para. 100. 
38
  Id., at para. 110; M. v. H., supra, note 17. 
39
  Id., at para. 112. 
40
  Id., at para. 115. 
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Achieving an appropriate balance between fairness to individual 
litigants and respecting the legislative role of Parliament may mean 
that Charter remedies will be directed more toward government action 
in the future and less toward the correction of past wrongs. In the 
present case, the Hislop class’s claim for a retroactive remedy is 
tantamount to a claim for compensatory damages flowing from the 
underinclusiveness of the former CPP. Imposing that sort of liability 
on the government, absent bad faith, unreasonable reliance or conduct 
that is clearly wrong, would undermine the important balance between 
the protection of constitutional rights and the need for effective 
government that is struck by the general rule of qualified immunity. A 
retroactive remedy in the instant case would encroach unduly on the 
inherently legislative domain of the distribution of government 
resources and of policy making in respect of this process.41 
The Supreme Court found that the fairness to litigants factor did not 
compel a retroactive remedy in the circumstances of this case.42 When 
considering this factor, it supported its decision not to award arrears by 
relying on the fact that the legislation being challenged was remedial 
legislation that was enacted in response to the Court’s previous decision 
in M. v. H.: 
Although M. v. H. declares what the Constitution requires, it does not 
give rise to an automatic right to every government benefit that might 
have been paid out had the Court always interpreted the Constitution 
in accordance with its present-day understanding of it. M. v. H. was 
not a case like Miron where limiting the retroactive effect of the 
s. 52(1) remedy would have granted the “successful” claimant a hollow 
victory. In contrast, a purely prospective remedy in M. v. H. was not 
meaningless. M. v. H. resulted in wide-scale amendments to federal 
and provincial legislation across the country to extend government 
benefits to same-sex couples. Equally important, M. v. H. helped usher 
in a new era of understanding of the equal human dignity of same-sex 
couples. One could not say that M. v. H. granted those litigants only a 
Pyrrhic victory. [emphasis added.]43 
                                                                                                             
41
  Id., at para. 117. 
42
  In my view, the Court unduly minimized the “fairness to litigants” factor. It was clearly 
unfair that a same-sex survivor whose partner died on the same day as a heterosexual contributor 
would not receive a pension equal to that of the heterosexual contributor’s survivor despite the fact 
their respective spouses would have been governed by the same contribution requirements to the 
CPP. This fact was not mentioned in the Court’s analysis of this factor (para. 116). However, in my 
view, this would not have changed the outcome of the analysis as this factor is outweighed by the 
other factors. 
43
  Supra, note 33, at para. 116. 
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In this passage the Supreme Court is recognizing that it would have 
been appropriate in M. v. H., if the Court had not suspended the 
declaration of invalidity in that case, to award a remedy that was 
prospective only.44 This being the case, following the suspended 
declaration in M. v. H., there was no obligation on the government to 
enact remedial legislation that was anything more than prospective. 
IV. COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TEST FOR RETROACTIVITY 
The test as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hislop raises 
a new issue in many constitutional challenges: is the claimant asking the 
court to make new law or to apply old law, which determines whether 
the court is operating inside or outside the Blackstonian paradigm. In 
many cases, the answer to this question will not be obvious. The 
problems raised by this issue may be somewhat muted by the fact that in 
almost every case, the decision of a court other than the Supreme Court 
of Canada to declare legislation unconstitutional will not reflect a 
“substantial change in the law” (because these courts are of course 
bound to apply the law of the Supreme Court).45 Thus, in most cases, 
lower courts will still be operating in the Blackstonian paradigm and 
therefore claimants that would otherwise receive a retroactive remedy 
are unlikely to be withheld one on the basis of Hislop by lower courts.46 
However, many substantial challenges to legislation will reach the 
Supreme Court and the nebulous nature of the test makes it difficult to 
predict ultimate outcomes with any certainty. Because of this, most 
                                                                                                             
44
  See the concurring judgment of Bastarache J. at para. 164, where he states:  
Particularly relevant, it seems to me, is the fact that the Modernization of Benefits and 
Obligations Act was enacted in response to this Court’s decision in M. v. H. In that case, 
a suspension of the declaration of invalidity was ordered so as to allow the Ontario 
government flexibility to cure the constitutional defect. That flexibility implicitly 
included the ability to limit the retroactive effect of any remedial legislation. Indeed, this 
is what the Ontario legislature chose to do. The remedial legislation was made 
prospective from November 20, 1999 (Amendments Because of the Supreme Court of 
Canada Decision in M. v. H. Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 6, s. 68(2)). Similar flexibility 
should be accorded to the Canadian government in this case. The legislative branch is 
better able to deal with distributional concerns than are courts, and its choices should be 
respected so long as they fall within the limits of the Constitution. 
45
  As recognized by the Supreme Court in Hislop, supra, note 33, at para. 111.  
46
  Theoretically, these courts will only be issuing retroactive remedies although practically, 
assuming the practice of suspending declarations is continued, the remedy received by claimants 
will be the prospective remedy enacted by the government in response to the declaration of 
invalidity. 
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lawyers advising their clients would be wise to caution that it is very 
difficult to predict whether the Court will grant a prospective or 
retroactive declaration in a given case.  
1.  The Threshold Question: A “Substantial Change” in the Law 
In my view, the formulation of this threshold question is 
problematic. As the Court itself recognizes in relation to the threshold of 
substantial change, “given the often incremental nature of changes in 
judge-made law in a common law system, the question [i.e. whether the 
declaration of invalidity represents a substantial change in the law] is 
bound to raise difficulties.”47 Clearly there would be substantial change 
where “the Supreme Court departs from its own jurisprudence by 
expressly overruling or implicitly repudiating a prior decision”.48 Such 
clear situations would justify recourse to prospective remedies in a 
proper context. However those cases will be rare. The Supreme Court 
gave little guidance for less clear situations:  
But other forms of substantial change may be as relevant, especially in 
constitutional adjudication, where courts must give content to broad, 
but previously undefined, rights, principles or norms. The definition of 
a yet undetermined standard or the recognition that a situation is now 
covered by a constitutional guarantee also often expresses a substantial 
change in the law. The right may have been there, but it finds an 
expression in a new or newly recognized technological or social 
environment. Such a legal response to these developments properly 
grounds the use of prospective remedies, when the appropriate 
circumstances are met.49
 
2.  “Substantial Change” Alone Does Not Justify a Purely 
Prospective Declaration  
The Court held that a “substantial change in the law is necessary, not 
sufficient, to justify purely prospective remedies”. It then went on to 
consider what more “must be considered once legal change has been 
established”. As listed above, the factors include good faith and 
reasonable reliance by governments; the fairness of the limitation of the 
                                                                                                             
47
  Hislop, supra, note 33, at para. 97. 
48
  Id., at para. 99. 
49
  Id. 
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retroactivity of the remedy to the litigants; and whether a retroactive 
remedy would unduly interfere with the constitutional role of legislatures 
and democratic governments in the allocation of public resources. For 
simplicity, I will refer to this as the “additional factors test”. 
In my view, it is quite likely that in most cases where there is a 
substantial change in the law, the Supreme Court will apply the 
additional factors test and find that a purely prospective remedy is 
justified. This is because where there is a substantial change in the law, it 
is likely that the government’s reliance on that law will be found to be 
reasonable and in good faith. While the second factor will generally 
support a fully retroactive remedy, I believe this factor will be 
outweighed, as it was in Hislop, by the reliance factors in combination 
with the fourth factor. The fourth factor of respecting the proper roles of 
government and the courts will support a remedy that is purely 
prospective.50 This is because in benefits cases, a range of options is 
open to government and the courts “normally do not know what the 
legislature would have done had it known that its benefits scheme failed 
to comply with the Charter”.51 The excluded group could simply be 
included in the existing benefit scheme, could be included in a modified 
benefit scheme or the government, facing the necessity of including an 
excluded group, could eliminate the benefit entirely. As stated by the 
Court “[i]n our political system, choosing between those options remains 
the domain of governments.”52 
Thus, the additional factors test will usually point towards limiting 
the retroactive effect of remedies in section 15 benefits cases. This view 
is consistent with the fact that there is no Supreme Court of Canada 
Charter case where the Court has imposed a retroactive remedy (without 
suspending its declaration) after determining that its finding of 
unconstitutional invalidity represented a substantial change in the law.53 
                                                                                                             
50
  The exception is cases of unconstitutional taxes, where the court has stated the fourth 
factor weighs against a purely prospective remedy since the only possible remedy is restitution to 
the taxpayer. Also, reliance interests are less significant since the government could simply legislate 
to recoup the unconstitutional tax retroactively. See Hislop, supra, note 33, at para. 108, where the 
Court discusses Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
51
  Hislop, supra, note 33, at para. 108. 
52
  Id. 
53
  Indeed, the only case where the Court has granted a retroactive declaration in a s. 15 case 
without suspending that declaration is Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 
(S.C.C.). In Hislop, the Court stated that its declaration of invalidity in Miron did not represent a 
substantial change in the law because the auto-insurance legislation at issue in that case was “out-of-
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V. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR SUPPORTING THE 
DECISION NOT TO AWARD FULLY RETROACTIVE ARREARS 
In my view, the result in Hislop, because of the general limit on 
retroactivity contained in section 72(1) of the impugned legislation, 
could have been upheld on the alternative basis that this subsection, even 
if it infringed section 15, was justified under section 1. Subsection 72(1) 
is a provision of general application that existed in the CPP before the 
MOBA and continued in force after the MOBA. On its face, this 
provision does not affect the class claimants (or any other group) 
differently than any other group.54 The purpose of the limitation in 
section 72(1) is to control the predictability of claims on the fund by 
limiting applicants to 12 months arrears following the death of their 
partner. 
At the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada, the Hislop 
class argued that although section 72(1) is facially neutral, its 12-month 
limitation on pension arrears had an adverse effect on same-sex 
survivors. This is because same-sex survivors were unable, prior to July 
2000, to make a claim for survivorship benefits. In this regard, the trial 
judge found that the members of the class did not sit on their rights. 
Most members of the class did not apply for the survivor’s pension when 
their partners died because they were not entitled under the CPP to 
apply.55 
The Supreme Court did not analyze the validity of section 72(1), 
preferring to characterize this attack as a disguised claim for retroactivity: 
Although the Hislop class frames the s. 72(1) argument as an adverse 
effect discrimination claim, the issue which the argument raises is, in 
fact, one of remedy. What the Hislop class is seeking is retroactive 
                                                                                                             
step” with other government legislation that included common law spouses in the definition of 
spouse. 
54
  After MOBA, ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) then excluded from eligibility all surviving same-sex 
partners whose partners died before January 1, 1998, and severely limited the retroactive payment of 
arrears. 
55
  The Court of Appeal found it was unclear from the record to what extent s. 72(1) would 
limit the entitlement of any particular class member as this depended on the date of application, 
which in some cases was a complex factual matter. At [2004] O.J. No. 4815, 73 O.R. (3d) 641, at 
para. 110, it stated “This issue may turn both on the tolling of the limitation period for the class 
under s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6, as well as on the findings of the trial judge 
in the proceedings that will be held in order to determine the extent of each class member’s 
entitlement to a pension.” However, it recognized that there was a good possibility that pursuant to 
s. 72(1), members of the class would only receive a fraction of the total amount they would have 
received had they been able to apply at the time of their partner’s death. 
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Charter relief. Their request for a constitutional exemption from the 
limitation on arrears in s. 72(1) is, in effect, a request for a remedy in 
respect of their exclusion from the survivors’ benefits by the pre-
MOBA CPP between 1985 and 2000. As will be explained hereafter, 
this Court has been explicit in restricting entitlement to retroactive 
Charter relief of this nature. Because the remedy sought by the Hislop 
class is unavailable in any event, it is not necessary to undertake a 
s. 15(1) analysis in respect of s. 72(1).56 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal addressed this 
argument head on, rejecting it as follows: 
It is only once s. 44(1.1) and s. 72(2) are declared unconstitutional that 
s. 72(1) may have an adverse effect on members of the plaintiff class, 
by limiting their entitlement to pension to twelve months of arrears, no 
matter when their partner died.  
..... 
However, here, s. 72(1) had no effect on the claimants either before or 
after the MOBA was enacted. Rather, the complaint lies with the 
application of this provision to the class members in respect of the 
period between 1985 and 2000. However, the only provisions that were 
inconsistent with the Charter for that period of time were the opposite-
sex spousal definition before the MOBA amendments, and s. 44(1.1) 
and s. 72(2) after the MOBA amendments, not the cap on arrears, nor 
the limitation in respect of estate claims.  
The general sections were, and still are, non-discriminatory in their 
purpose and their effect. The true cause of the adverse effect is not the 
general sections, but rather, the fact that the class members were 
altogether excluded from the CPP regime both before and after the 
MOBA amendments.57 
And: 
Consequently, it was those specific sections added to the CPP by the 
MOBA that limited the rights of same-sex surviving partners. Section 
72(1) did not limit same-sex survivors’ rights.58 
In my view, the Supreme Court ought to have conducted the analysis 
of the validity of section 72(1) (in the direct manner of the Court of 
Appeal) because this analysis may well have given the Court additional 
                                                                                                             
56
  Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, at para. 69 (S.C.C.). 
57
  Decision of the Court of Appeal, Hislop, supra, note 55, at paras. 106-109. 
58
  Id., at para. 105. 
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support for its decision not to award fully retroactive arrears. Whether or 
not section 72(1) infringed the section 15 rights of the claimants (I agree 
with the Court of Appeal that it did not), in my view it was justified 
under section 1.59 This is because where the government enacts a general 
law to limit retroactive claims against a benefit scheme, for the reasons 
expressed by the Supreme Court in its retroactivity analysis, the limit 
would survive the Oakes test even assuming it had an adverse effect on 
an excluded group. The measure obviously has a pressing and substantial 
purpose — to ensure the financial integrity of the scheme by limiting the 
possibility of retroactive arrears — and the limit is obviously rationally 
connected to that purpose. There are also good arguments to make that 
the minimal impairment analysis — always the most controversial prong 
of the test — would also be satisfied in many of these cases. This is 
because in the context of a government decision to limit retroactivity, the 
courts should take a deferential approach and not engage in second 
guessing government line-drawing. To do otherwise could well put a 
chill on the development of government benefit schemes. Finally, 
assuming the minimal impairment analysis is met, it would be unlikely 
that the Court would find that the limit fails the final balancing in the 
third prong of the Oakes proportionality analysis.60 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hislop is an important case for many reasons. This paper has 
explored the Court’s decision on the remedial issues in the case and its 
examination of the theoretical foundations for the retroactive nature of 
the declaration of invalidity. Up to this point in the jurisprudence, while 
                                                                                                             
59
  Other authors have argued that the Court should have conducted a s. 1 analysis in Hislop 
and that analysis would have led the Court to a different result on the retroactive payment of arrears 
issue, especially in light of the fact that the eligibility limit s. 44(1.1) was not upheld under s. 1 (e.g. 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 2, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at 58-4.2). 
With respect to those differing views, I do not agree. In my view, the question of whether a 
retroactive limit (i.e., s. 72(2)) is justified under s. 1 is a very different question from whether a 
retrospective limit (i.e., s. 44(1.1)), is justified under s. 1 and therefore the answer to these questions 
need not be the same, even if, as here, the financial cost to government was not insurmountable. 
60
  This paragraph is a short response to those critics who suggest that the Supreme Court 
attempted to evade a s. 1 analysis on the issue of retroactive arrears in Hislop (see Hogg, supra, note 
59). Professor Hogg argues that the Court erred in Hislop by recognizing that remedial legislation 
need not be retroactive. In his view, legislation curing a Charter defect must be retroactive to the 
inception of the Charter unless its non-retroactive element is justified under s. 1. His view leads to 
the incongruous result that, in contrast to legislation curing a Charter defect, legislation curing a 
constitutional defect arising from the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, would always have 
to be fully retroactive since s. 1 only applies with respect to the Charter. 
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the practice has deviated from the theory, there was little examination of 
the underpinnings for deviations from the Blackstonian approach. With 
its decision in Hislop, the Court has begun to explore a theoretical 
justification for these deviations. 
In conclusion, although extremely important on a theoretical level, I 
do not believe that there will be great practical consequences of the 
Supreme Court’s decision on retroactivity in Hislop, for three primary 
reasons. First, in many cases claimants raising constitutional issues will 
be satisfied with a purely prospective remedy and Hislop does not 
restrict their ability to get a remedy of that nature in any way.61 Second, 
in most cases where a declaration is sought, the Supreme Court of 
Canada will continue to grant a suspended declaration — Hislop 
provides more theoretical support for these suspended declarations. 
Third, those worried about the broad implications of Hislop could 
attempt in future cases to argue that Hislop should be seen as a case 
decided largely on the unique legislative record at issue.62 As suggested 
by Professor Hogg, the Court’s decision may have been influenced by 
the “appeal of keeping corrective action prospective only, both in terms 
of cost to government, simplicity of administration, and avoidance of tax 
complications and other unintended impacts on individuals”.63 While the 
approach in Hislop is a broad one and the language sweeping, it could be 
argued that the decision should be limited to situations where 
government acts proactively to cure constitutional defects. On this basis, 
a deferential approach in Hislop can be justified while at the same time 
distinguishing the case from other situations where the government has 
not taken proactive steps to cure constitutional defects.64 
                                                                                                             
61
 When a government adds previously excluded groups to benefit plans prospectively, it 
will not usually exclude part of that group in an unconstitutional manner. The retrospective 
restriction in Hislop (by date of partner death) provided an obvious target by creating a situation 
where claimants had to go to court to change the law to receive a retrospective remedy. The issue of 
retroactivity was a natural add-on to the retrospective claim. 
62
 The success of this argument would depend on the persuasiveness of the submission that 
the Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the unique fact that the impugned legislation was 
proactive remedial legislation intended to implement the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in M. 
v. H, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
63
  Hogg, supra, note 59, at 58-4.1, note 8k. 
64
  The fact that this case involved a challenge to an Act that already contained a general 
limit on retroactivity, although not a focus of the Supreme Court’s remedial analysis, may turn out 
to be an additional way of limiting Hislop to its facts when a future claim for a retroactive benefit is 
made. 
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VII. APPENDIX: RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE  
CANADA PENSION PLAN 
1.  Retrospective Eligibility Limit 
44(1.1) In the case of a common-law partner who was not, 
immediately before the coming into force of this subsection, a person 
described in subparagraph (a)(ii) of the definition of “spouse” in 
subsection 2(1) as that definition read at that time, no survivor’s 
pension shall be paid under paragraph 1(d) unless the common-law 
partner becomes a survivor on or after January 1, 1998. 
2.  Limit on Retroactive Payment of Arrears for Newly Included 
Same-Sex Survivors 
72(2) In the case of a survivor who was the contributor’s common-
law partner and was not, immediately before the coming into force of 
this subsection, a person described in subparagraph (a)(ii) of the 
definition “spouse” in subsection 2(1) as that definition read at that 
time, no survivor’s pension may be paid for any month before the 
month in which this subsection comes into force. 
3.  General Provision Limiting Retroactive Arrears 
72(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 62, where payment of a 
survivor’s pension is approved, the pension is payable... in no case 
earlier than the twelfth month preceding the month following the 
month in which the application was received. 
 
